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The Khmer Way of Exile: Lessons from Three Indochinese 
Wars 
Craig Etcheson 
University of Southern Calif omia 
Introduction: The Khmer Way of Exile 
The Cambodian peasant economy has been a powerful 
force for continuity in Khmer society over the millenia. The once 
imposing power of the Khmer imperial state had declined over the 
the preceding millenium, but the conservative peasant base 
continued to sustain the twin pillars of Khmer society - the 
Khmer monarchy and the Theravada Buddhist monachy -
through the 1960s. Mysticism and survival are uniquely inter-
twined in the person of the Khmer monarch: as official owner of 
all the land. he feeds the body; as the God-King. he feeds the 
spirit. With the rituals of daily life revolving around Buddhism 
and farming. and with the King in his dual role as head-of-state 
and head-of-religion, the King has for many centuries repre-
sented the symbolic center of the Khmer nation. Since before 
World War II, this symbolic power has been embodied in a person 
named Norodom Sihanouk. 
At the age of 67. Norodom Sihanouk has been at the 
center of Southeast Asian politics for fifty years . Placed on the 
throne of Cambodia at age eighteen by his French colonial 
masters. the durable monarch has seen countless prime minis-
ters, scores of regimes. and not a few states come and go - in 
Cambodia alone. Although it has been thirty years since he 
abdicated as King and twenty years since his regime was 
overthrown. he is now positioning himself to return to Cambodia 
as head-of-state in a new coalition government apparently 
emerging from several years of incredibly Byzantine negotia-
tions. While Journalistic commentary commonly prefaces his 
name with descriptors such as "unreliable. K "mercurialM and 
"elusive. M his survival amidst a half-century of extended chaos 
speaks to the power of the symbols he commands. 
This half-century of chaos is delimited by historians into 
three principalconflicts: the First Indochinese War ( 1941-1955). 
mainly between the Vietnamese and the French; the Second 
Indochinese War (1955-1975). between the Vietnamese and the 
Americans: and the Third Indochinese War (1975-present). 
between the Vietnamese and a Sino-Khmer alliance, with many 
additional players in all three wars. One of the most interesting 
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aspects of collective Cambodian political behavior over this 
eriod is recurring use of the technique of the exile government ~ with Sihanouk at the center of exile action in three successive 
wars. Such a pattern invites analysis. Who will prevail in the 
current struggle for power in Cambodia? How have Khmer 
leaders used the government-in-exile technique to defend their 
rule against stronger foreign powers? What is the relationship 
between the success of an exile state organization and the 
symbolic attributes of the nationhood inhering in the social 
formations of the Khmer people? We will explore these questions 
by looking to Cambodian history for clues. 
The Byzantine maneuvering of politicians in the Third 
Indochinese War is entirely consistent with the patterns and 
dynamics of regional political interaction in all three Indochinese 
conllicts. In the First Indochinese War. Sihanouk skillfully used 
the existence ofrebels and exile organizations on the left and the 
right of the Cambodian political spectrum to pressure the French 
colonialists into concessions hastening Cambodian independ-
ence. In the Second Indochinese War. Sihanouk was overthrown 
by his ministers and promptly formed an exile government with 
his former adversary. the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP). 
also known as the "Khmer Rouge." In the Third Indochinese War. 
the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge state of Democratic 
Kampuchea. bringing to power a group of Khmer exiles from 
Democratic Kampuchea. and prompting Sihanouk to again form 
an exile government with the KCP. 
What motivates Khmer leaders to form exile govern-
ments? In principle. at least three distinct abstract purposes 
suggest themselves as possible explanations. In the first war. 
anti-colonialism against the French was cited by all participants 
as the principal motive; in the second war. domestic rivalry 
among numerous Khmer factions was clearly an important 
factor; and in the third and recent war. struggle against the 
occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops was touted by the 
thrne main resistance factions as the over-riding reason for 
fighting. In practice. however. the motives are much less clearly 
defined than the three clear-cut explanations of anti-colonial-
ism. domestic rivalry. and anti-occupation. In fact. elements of 
all three purposes played important roles in each of the three 
Indochinese Wars of the twentieth century. 
In that first Indochinese struggle. it was not only the 
Khmer radicals who resisted the legal. French colonial Cambo-
dian government. Following the French reassertion of colonial 
power in Indochina after World War II, Cambodians across the 
political spectrum struggled for independence from France. 
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Radical and conservative groups allke resorted to paramil itary 
action against French interests, raising the pressure on the 
colonialists and creating an opening that young King Sihano uk 
skillfully exploited. Leading independence-minded politicia ns of 
the left and the light in Cambodian politics soon found the m-
selves frozen out of the action by Sihanouk's mastery of his 
position as the symbolic center of the nation. He succee ded in 
winning independence from France for Cambodia at the Geneva 
Conference in 1954, a triumph so complete that he contin ued to 
dominate Cambodian politics through the 1950s and 1960s. In 
this period, Sihanouk practiced an authorttarian politics of the 
center, including a liberal employment of securtty forces that 
reduced the internal Cambodian left to a dwindling extincti on . 
Their defenselessness against the government convinced some 
Cambodian revolutionairies that armed resistance was nece s-
sary . 
In the early years of the Second Indochinese War. King 
(later, Prince) Sihanouk managed to insulate his country from 
the worst of the violence raking Vietnam and Laos. When the 
Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP) finally launched arme d 
struggle in 1968, they had little success in the first two years on 
their own. But growing discontent among the Khmer elite over 
Vietnamese occupation oflarge tracts in the eastern provinces of 
the country soon led to a military coup against Sihanouk in 1970 . 
The KCP leaped at the opportunity to form a broad partners hip 
with the overthrown prtnce and assorted left- leaning soc ial 
democratic elements. This proved to be the key to success, and 
the undoing of the nearly two thousand years of traditi on 
represented by Sihanouk. Under the banner of the exiled Royal 
GovernmentfortheNatlonalUnificationofKampuchea(GRU NK), 
the Khmer communists marched to victory in 1975 only to 
abruptly liquidate their partners and seize absolute power . The 
KCP had learned well the lesson of the First Indochinese War. The 
center was necessary to attain victory, but it must be destroye d 
the moment victory is achieved or else it may tum and destroy the 
revolution. 
The Third Indochinese War came close on the heels of th e 
second . In 1979, only three years and two days after the foundin g 
of their state, Democratic Kampuchea. Khmer Rouge aggress ion 
against Vietnam precipitated their rout from power by the 
Vietnamese army. This time, more reluctantly, the Khmer Roug e 
gradually maneuvered to assemble a remarkably similar "coali-
tionn partnership consisting of Prince Sihanouk , social dem o-
cratic elements, and other groups. True to their hubris-soake d 
form. the Khmer Rouge did not bother to wait until victory to 
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begin liquidating their coalition partners. The behavior of the 
l{hmer Rouge toward their coalition partners in the Third Indo-
chinese War has been consistent with their strategy in the 
second Indochinese War. When they are in power the policy is 
systematic purge and in the chaos of wartime the policy is 
random ambush . Despite this fratricidal spirit among the coali-
uon partners. the coalition appeared to be moving slowly toward 
an international settlement which would bring all or part of it to 
power in Phnom Penh . Exactly which part or parts end up coming 
to power in Cambodia is crucial to the future social order of the 
country. 
History may be on the verge of repeating itself in Cambo-
dia. But which history will it be? That of the First Indochinese 
war. with its relatively- and I emphasize relative, for when in 
power Sihanouk did not shrink from the use of force - benign 
centrist solution? Or. that of the Second Indochinese War. an 
extremist solution followed by purges. execution and starvation 
on a grand scale? In a number of respects the situation of the 
Khmer exile community in the Third Indochinese War resembles 
that of the First Indochinese War more than that of the Second 
Indochinese War . The outcome for Cambodia of the Third Indo-
chinese War will be determined by the balance of forces within 
the disintegrating exile regime, the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). between the CGDK factions 
and the existing weak government in Phnom Penh. and among 
the interested regional and global powers. Khmer politicians 
have a history of successfully using the technique of a govern-
ment-in -exile. if not to resolve conflict, at least to transform the 
conditions of violence from external threat to civil war. It appears 
that in at least this one respect, the outcome of the Third 
Indochinese War will parallel that of the first two: exile groups 
seem likely to achieve national power in Cambodia. In other 
respects. the outcome of the Third Indochinese War is likely to be 
unique in the history of Indochina's conflicts. 
Khmer Issarak Strategy in First Indochinese War 
As the authority of the French empire collapsed during 
World War II. Cambodians anxious for independence seized the 
opportunity to establish a free government. With some intrigue 
on the part of the Japanese. early in 1945 a group of Khmer 
partisans led by Son Ngoc Thanh succeeded in setting up a short-
lived "free democratic" Cambodian government. At the end of the 
war , however. the allies decided that French colonial forces 
remaining in Indochina were well-positioned to disarm and 
arrest the Japanese occupation forces. The French also arrested 
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"trouble-makers" like Son Ngoc Thanh. The sequence of rising 
hopes for independence followed by colonial re-occupation set 
the stage for the First Indochinese War, and spawned resistance 
movements throughout Indochina. Depending on how one counts 
- and who is counting - there were at least two, maybe three , 
four, or more identifiable Cambodian exile governments during 
the First Indochinese War. The most important of these exile 
groups were collectively known as the "Khiner Issarak" (or "Free 
Khmer") even though the so-named groups represented various 
wide-ranging and often completely contradictory interests from 
republican to communist, Siamese-leaning to Vietnamese-lean-
ing. 
Some of the conflicting tendencies in Cambodian politics 
that helped push Cambodia toward independence from France 
after World War II are illustrated in the activities of two men with 
confusingly similar names: Son Ngoc Thanh and Son Ngoc Minh . 
To add to the confusion, both men led largely ineffectual rival 
exile governments on the right and the left (respectively) during 
the First Indochinese War. While their exile governments never 
came close to achieving national power, they played vital roles in 
the Cambodian movement for independence from France. 
Son Ngoc Thanh was the more prominent of the two. 
representing the interests of the French-educated intellectual 
class with Western preferences. His career is bracketed with two 
equally brief and disastrous stints as Prime Minister. first in the 
wartime free Khmer government of 1945, and then in the wartime 
Khmer Republican government of 1972. He had earned the 
eternal ire of the King by pushing Sihanouk aside in forming the 
1945 free democratic government, and Sihanouk returned the 
favor by seeing Thanh imprisoned and exiled to France after the 
war. Shortly after his return to Cambodia in 1951. Thanh fled the 
capitol and formed a right-leaning exile government in the 
northern border province of Siem Reap.• Although Sihanouk 
repeatedly sent his army to attack Thanh ·s bases. with Thai 
assistance Thanh perservered for several years. Finally after 
failing to win recognition at the Geneva Convention of 1954. he 
gave up his exile quest and accepted new patrons. Thanh himself 
was irrepressible in his quest for national leadership, variously 
allying himself with the Japanese, the Siamese, the Vietnamese, 
and the Americans in repeated attempts to achieve the leader-
ship role he believed was his destiny. Although foreign sponsor-
ship seems to be a prerequisite for the success of a Khmer exile 
government. and though Thanh clearly understood this, still he 
lacked a vital ingredient: the symbolic Khmer center. 
Son Ngoc Minh faced the internal legitimacy problem to 
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an even greater degree. A former Buddhist monk from the lost 
unperial Khmer provinces now known as southern Vietnam, 
Minh selected his nom de guerre in part to evoke Son Ngoc 
Thanh's well-established rebel image and in part to ameliorate 
bis possibly suspect Vietnamese connections. This was a legiti-
mate concern. because until 1951 the Cambodian communist 
operated largely as a branch of the Vietnamese party. But the 
l{hmer communist movement had grown considerably since the 
French returned in 1946, particularly but not exclusively in the 
eastern provinces along the border with Vietnam. By the time the 
Khmer communists split from the Vietnamese Workers Party in 
1951 to form the independent Khmer People's Party, Minh had 
achieved leadership of a vibrant movement,• and by 1952 he 
became President of the little-remembered exile Khmer Resis-
tance Government. However, Minh's problem with internal legiti-
macy within Cambodia would prove disastrous in the negotia-
tions leading to Cambodian independence, where Sihanouk 
would derisively dismiss Minh's exile movement with the labels 
wKhmer Rouge" and "Khmer Viet Minh," evoking both their 
communist and Vietnamese connections. 
Sihanouk deftly maneuvered among the various tenden-
cies of these exile governments, playing them off one against 
another and against interested foreign powers. He did this so 
expertly that he managed to achieve near-dictatorial powers. 
Neartheclimaxofhis "Royal Crusade for Independence," in mid-
1953 Sihanouk went into voluntary "exile" first in Thailand and 
then in Siem Reap province, the same province where Son Ngoc 
Thanh with the aid of Thai authorities proclaimed an independ-
ence movement. The French already feared that the rightist pro-
Siamese Son Ngoc Thanh was allied to the leftist pro-Vietnamese 
Son Ngoc Minh. The terrifying if absurd vision of a united front 
among Cambodian monarchists, democrats and communists 
along with their respective Vietnamese, Laotian, and Siamese 
allies moved the French. Within a matter of months they yielded 
to the King's demands for autonomy. Thus did Sihanouk learn a 
lesson about using one's enemies. It was a lesson which would 
serve him poorly in the next Indochinese War. 
The French sued for peace, and the interested parties 
converged on Geneva early in 1954 to begin positioning for the 
settlement. In the days leading up to the Geneva Conference a 
flurry of activity continued to increase the pressure on the 
beleaguered French government. On May 3, Son Ngoc Minh 
formally demanded representation for his Khmer Resistance 
Government at the conference table in Geneva .s As if to under-
line the seriousness of the resistance, on May 7, the eve of the 
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conference, the French ganison at Dien Bien Phu fell to Genera} 
Giap's siege. At the opening session of the conference the next 
morning, Vietnamese delegate Pham Van Dong forcefully repre-
sented the demands ofMinh's exile government for recognition, 
a demand rejected both by the French and Royal Khmer dele-
gates . This contributed to an immediate deadlock of the confer-
ence, leading soon to the collapse of the French government. 
Action then shifted as a new French government emerged and its 
leader, Pierre Mendes-France, began negotiating behind the 
scenes with China's Chou En-Lai to find the solution to the 
puzzle. The Chinese, while eager to see a dilTusion of colonial 
power on their southern flank, had conflicting interests. On the 
one hand, the modem interests of proletarian internationalism 
dictated unwavering Chinese support for the battlefield sacri-
fices of their Vietnamese brothers. On the other hand, the 
ancient interests of imperial power dictated that whatever was 
necessary be done to prevent consolidation of an independent 
Vietnam holding sway over all Indochina. Traditional interests 
would carry the day. After a quiet meeting in southern China 
between Chou En-lai and Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh. Pham 
Van Dong received new instructions in Geneva. There would be 
partition in Vietnam, and there would be no recognition for the 
resistance movement in Kampuchea, despite the fact that resis-
tance forces held fully two-thirds of the county -side in both 
Vietnam and Kampuchea . The resentments and suspicions 
sown among Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian communists 
at the conference ending the First Indochinese War simmered 
and smouldered for twenty years before exploding into combat in 
the Third Indochinese War . 
In sum, for a time Son Tgoc Thanh's Issarak exile 
government of the First Indochinese War did find an external 
host in Thailand, but the Siamese proved uncommitted in the 
long run and provided no serious financial or military backing to 
the would-be Khmer rebels . The Vietnamese likewise provided 
encouragement and guidance for their protegee, Son Ngoc Minh ·s 
Khmer Resistance Government, but pulled that support the 
moment their own strategic interests so dictated . This should be 
viewed as a major factor in the failure of the Cambodian exile 
governments to achieve power on their own terms in the First 
Indochinese War . An enthusiastic and steadfast external patron 
seems to be necessary for a Khmer exile government to come to 
power. 
The lack of internal legitimacy among the populace must 
be viewed as a secondary strategic reason for the failure of the 
Khmer exile governments in the First Indochinese War . They 
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could not command the allegiance of the symbolic center. Viewed 
in terms of their historical signillcance, these exile governments 
were important not in and of themselves, but rather as foils for 
Sihanouk to use in his fencing with domineering foreign powers. 
With the "Khmer Viet Minh" forces on the left, and the "Khmer 
Jssarak" forces on the rtght, Sihanouk naturally commanded the 
center. Because the traditional locus of political and religious 
authority resided in the King, Sihanouk easily prevailed. It was 
a lesson that most of the participants never forgot: even if you 
out-organize the opposition and stake out the moral high-
ground, you must control the symbols of nationhood or you will 
succeed neither with the Cambodian people nor with the inter-
national community. 
Khmer Rouge Strategy in Second Indochinese War 
The principal issue behind the Second Indochinese War 
concerned who would rule the Vietnamese people. Sihanouk had 
struggled valiantly through the 1960s to insulate his tiny Royal 
state of Cambodia from the devastation of the Vietnamese-
American war, but after his overthrow in 1970 the flames 
engulfed Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk had been battling a small 
domestic guerilla insurgency led by the heretofore inept Kampu-
chean Communist Party (KCP), but when the deposed monarch 
abruptly Joined forces with the communists in the exiled Royal 
Government of Khmer National Unification, their movement 
exploded across the nation and literally tore the existing social 
order to bits. It was an impressive achievement, considering that 
Pol Pot's KCP had been founded only a mere ten years before. 
In 1961, the ten year old Khmer People's Party was 
reconstituted as the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP). 
albeit one that consisted of little more than a central committee. 
The Khmer People's Party had been decimated by Sihanouk's 
security forces, aided by well-placed spies through the 1950s. 
The tiny new KCP had no effect on the inability of the party to 
recruit a mass grass-roots following in the cities or any signifi-
cant following at all among the predominant ethnic Khmer rural 
population. The general failure of attempts to organize among 
both the urban and rural populations lent support to the 
Vietnamese Communist Party analysis of the situation, which 
Son Ngoc Minh's now-defunct Khmer People's Party had shared. 
This line held that Cambodia had not reached the requisite stage 
of socio-economic development to support socialist revolution. 
and therefore the proper role of progressive elements of Cambo-
dian society was to reinforce Sihanouk's anti-imperialist (read 
anU-U.S.) tendencies, and support the revolutionary struggle in 
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Vietnam . This analysis was widely held within the Kampuche an 
Communist Party, although it was not shared by a cruc ial 
leadership cllque. Pol Pot (#1 in the KCP) and Ieng Sary (#3) 
believed that armed struggle would ultimately be require d . 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion prevailed and the princ ipal 
activities pursued by the party in early 1960s concerned pro pa -
ganda and agitation, mainly among the publlc and private 
schools of the larger cities in Cambodia. The party was in no way 
prepared for war when events early in 1967 forced them to rev ise 
their strategy from political struggle to armed struggle. 
What was essentially a limited tax rebellion am ong 
peasants in the northwestern agricultural province of Batta m -
bang in January 1967 became a major turning point in the 
history of the KCP. While the party held fast to the line that the 
people were not ready for armed revolt, peasant masses more or 
less spontaneously took up arms against the govenrment. Th us , 
the so-called Samlaut Rebelllon presented the KCP with a spec ies 
of challenge which is the death of many organizations: the bas ic 
doctrinal assumption was suddenly and undeniably refuted by 
reality. The Khmer Rouge successfully adapted by claiming the 
rebellion as their own and declaring (retroactive) armed strugg le. 
These events marked the beginning of a two year period of slow 
and only marginally effective guerrilla struggle by a party whic h 
had not seriously begun to contemplate, let alone prepare for , 
war. Samlaut also had a very important internal political conse -
quence within the Kampuchean Communist Party: it reinforce d 
the position of the "Pol Pot" group in the Central Committee, who 
had argued that only armed rebellion could break the combine d 
grips of feudal, colonial, commercial and imperial enemies of 
Kampuchea. This tum of events helped entrench Pol Pot's allies 
in key positions throughout the revolutionary apparatus of th e 
Kampuchean Communist Party. 
The Khmer Rouge generally proved inept at exploiting the 
splendid opening offered by peasant resentment in Battamba ng 
and other provinces. A little ground was gained in remote and 
historically rebellious areas, but at the rate sustained in 1968 
and 1969, it would have been a very long struggle, one not at all 
certain of success. Yet the rate of change in Cambodia was about 
to go off of the scale. The 1970 coup d'etat against Norodom 
Sihanouk by Sirik Matak and Lon Nol was a watershed event in 
the political history of the Second Indochinese War, for this act 
cataclysmically transformed the international strategic land -
scape of the region, with catastrophic consequences for the 
existing social order in Kampuchea. Prior to the coup, the Khmer 
Rouge had struggled against Sihanouk's regime alone with 
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1.rtually no assistance from their supposedly fraternal brother 
;arties tn the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
and North and South Vietnam. After the coup, Sihanouk. the 
PRC. and the Vietnamese all suddenly found it in their interests 
to be of considerable assistance to the struggling Cambodian 
revolutionaries. The coup also set the stage for formation of a 
coalition government-in-exile which would come to power after a 
vicious fiVe-year civil war. 
Norodom Sihanouk was the most important element in 
the victory, and the key to the entire Khmer Rouge strategy. 
Sihanouk could deliver both Khmer peasants and Western 
nations . The Vietnamese were also very important in the new 
strategy. for when Lon Nol and Sirik Matak suddenly changed 
Sihanouk's policy of covert cooperation with the Vietnamese 
revolutionaries to a policy of confrontation and ultimatum, the 
Vietnamese did not hesitate lo tum and pummel the new-born 
Khmer Republic . Notwithstanding repeated Khmer Rouge claims 
of military prowess. this allowed the Khmer Rouge a relatively 
smooth cruise to victory. The government of the People's Repub-
lic of China had also found it convenient to cooperate with 
Sihanouk's government, but after Sihanouk was deposed there 
was no longer any reason to support the now clearly reactionary 
Cambodian regime and continue to neglect proper fraternal 
relations with the Kampuchean Communist Party . The Chinese 
proved to be the most important ally in the long run when they 
provided a lifeboat for the apocalypse ten years later. Both the 
Vietnamese and the Chinese communists had tacitly and other-
wise assisted Sihanouk in his war with the Kampuchean com-
munists, and so it was an astonishing transformation of the 
international strategic landscape when these banes of the KCP's 
existence suddenly became eager allies in th ~ Khmer Rouge plan 
to seize power. 
The KCP instituted a number of tactical innovations in 
their strategy to cope with the portentious changes in the 
political terrain of Southeast Asia wrought by the 1970 coup 
d'etat in Cambodia. The most important innovations concerned 
the rapid construction of internal, external. and international 
united fronts. This complex of three interlocking organizations 
formed the public face of the revolution. The internal united front 
with Sihanouk - called FUNK (the National United Front for 
Kampuchea) - functioned mainly as a recruitment arm, but was 
perceived by the Khmer Rouge as completely irrelevant upon 
victory. The external united front, the nominal exile government. 
came to be called by the acronym. GRUNK (Royal Government of 
Khmer National Unification); GRUNKfunctioned to legitimize the 
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revolution in the regional and international arenas . Accordingly, 
in theory. the leadership of GRUNK was evenly divided between 
followers of Sihanouk and followers of the KCP. In practice 
however, Sihanouk's people got mostly diplomatic posts anct 
titles conferring no real authority within the revolution. The 
international united front - a putative alliance among the 
revolutionaries in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea call UFTip 
(the United Front of the Three Indochinese Peoples) - was the 
least significant of the fronts. Nominally representing the com-
mon interests of the Indochinese revolutionary movements in 
resisting "U.S. imperialism," UFTIP was in reality a chimera in 
the shadows of which Laotian. Vietnamese, and Khmer revolu-
tionary organizations separately pursued their individual self-
interested ends. The KCP benefited from this liaison. to some 
extent from the propaganda advantage. but principally from a 
cornucopia of military aid from the Vietnamese communists. The 
three united front organizations played crucial social, political. 
propaganda , diplomatic, and recruitment functions, but real 
power on the ground in Cambodia was always held by the army: 
PFI.ANK (the People's National Liberation Armed Forces of 
Kampuchea) . 
PFI.ANK was always completely under the control of 
members of the secret Central Committee of the KCP. However, 
winning the war was only the first task assigned to PFI.ANK. The 
most crucial political issue in Kampuchea became who controls 
the security apparatus. The Central Committee of the Kampuch-
ean Communist Party maintained direct personal control of the 
army units. but exactly which members of the Central Commit-
tee held command became a life and death matter in the months 
following victory . In 1970 - 1973, however, it was Vietnamese 
military aid that kept the revolutionary organizations growing. 
This military aid came not only in the form of advisors and arms, 
but in many cases direct military intervention to fight the fights 
of the young PFI.ANK, which until 1973 was not at all prepared 
to shoulder the burden of the civil war with it's own resources. 
For many in academia and the press, the romanticism in 
the image of a rebel prince leading a peasant revolution against 
a corrupt neo-colonial quisling regime was too much to resist.• 
But Sihanouk 's attempt to relive his triumph in using exile 
governments during his "Royal Crusade for Independence" from 
France in the early 1950s was foredoomed to a humiliating 
failure . The Khmer Rouge used the King with a mastery and 
subtlety seldom seen in modern political history. This failure did 
much to reinforce Sihanouk's image as an unreliable vainglori-
ous fool. It also did much to enshrine the Khmer Rouge external 
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perception and internal self-image as infallably brilliant politi-
cians and revolutionaries. Sihanouk may yet surprise his critics; 
so may the Khmer Rouge. 
The practice of the Khmer Rouge in the Second Indochi-
nese War was to unify the country under the Sihanouk-led 
banners of FUNK and GRUNK. and then to liquidate all contend-
ers for power with their army. the PF LANK. This was reflected in 
Khmer Rouge theory in the notion of "mastery." Central to their 
doctrine. mastery was expressed in the overblown self-confi-
dence of their peasant troops. One gets a better sense of the 
radicalism of the Khmer Rouge revolution. and how this psycho-
logical sense of power evolved in the movement. by seeing how 
they created and used social institutions to transform the social 
and political culture of the nation in a very brief period. 
FUNK was the key to controlling the peasantry. The 
function of FUNK was to convince the deeply traditional and 
conservative peasantry the the revolution represented the inter-
ests of the monarchy and the monachy; but there was much 
more. Their methods demonstrate that the Khmer Rouge were 
social engineers who planned ahead. With a view to the future. 
the Khmer Rouge focused on children and young adults. One of 
the many organizations operated by FUNK was the Patriotic 
Youth Organization (PYA). The enormous number of young 
peasants who joined the revolution out of respect for the appeals 
of the exiled former King Sihanouk and the traditional values 
that he embodied were funneled into the PYA. Naturally. the 
values these youngsters had been raised with were considerably 
at odds with the inner program of the KCP Central Committee. 
The Khmer Rouge devised the PYA system to winnow a few 
hopeful cases from the masses being readied to die for the 
revolution. A system of PYAyouth training camps was founded, 
where the young peasants were drilled in elementary military 
technique and basic revolutionary doctrine. As one analyst 
reported at the time, "returning youngsters fiercely condemned 
religion and custom, rejected paternal authority and showed a 
marked confidence in mechanical weapons and a rejection of the 
mystical."• Apparently this training was effective. and the combat 
performance of these child-soldiers impressed even seasoned 
warriors. As Sihanouk put it, the child-soldiers were trained to 
believe that the society against which they fought - and which 
they came to understand that Sihanouk more than anyone else 
represented - was "despicable. contemptible. corrupt. unjust 
and oppressive in the extreme."• 
Those who distinguished themselves in battle and were 
deemed to possess potential for the party might be advanced to 
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membership in theAlHance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea 
(known by it's Khmer acronym. Yuv. K.K.). As an official orga n of 
the KCP. the Yuv. K.K. was a covert organization, entirely secret. 
The 1973 inaugural issue of the Yuv. K.K. propaganda organ 
stated the aim of the organization as "causing the ado ption" 
among the youth of Kampuchea "a new revolutionaryworldvt ew.", 
These young warriors, known in Khmer Rouge party lexicon as 
"the dictatorial instrument of the party," became the shock 
troops of the new order, assigned after the war to herd the masses 
of workers from work site to work site. In 1975 victory was 
declared under the GRUNK flag, but PFLANK was in contr ol. The 
PFLANK was the cutting edge of revolution, but raw force was 
combined with sophisticated organization and propaganda by 
the theorists and social engineers of Khmer Rouge revoluti on. 
In summary, the Kampuchean Communist Party st rat-
egy for the Second Indochinese War involved forming an exile 
coalition government. marginalizing the coalition while winni ng 
the civil war, and seizing absolute power. This series of sophis -
ticated procedures secured the transformation of their exile 
government into a sovereign nation-state during and after the 
Second Indochinese War. The first problem was to gain control 
of the key symbolic cultural icons of the nation - the King, the 
Buddhist monks, the capitol, and the ruins in the countrys ide. 
These in hand. the process of changing the association in 
people's minds between the symbols of nationhood and the 
revolution could begin in earnest. This elaborate program (known 
as "De-Sihanoukization") began in some of the liberated areas as 
early as 1973. 8 Simultaneously. the process of physically liqui-
dating all competing apparati within the FUNK organiza tion 
commenced. This began with liquidation of all ethnic Vietname se 
servtng in the revolutionary organizations, and proceeded out -
ward in waves through first the various front organizations and 
finally the party itself. All who did not maintain the confidence of 
the KCP security apparat would be "disappeared." Effective 
control of the FUNK organization gradually came into the han ds 
of the Khmer Rouge through this kind of creeping administra tive 
coup d'etat, so that eventually all activity except Sihan ouk's 
diplomatic corps in Bejing was controlled on the groun d in-
country by trusted party members. Norodom Sihanouk, whil e no 
more than a figurehead, proVided the revolution with unp roble-
matical possession of the symbolic center of the nation. This 
brought along not only the people of Cambodia, but als o the 
international community. When this had been accomplishe d , it 
was possible to begin the marginalization of the internal diplo-
matic cover represented by Sihanouk's entourage in China. Once 
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this was done. Cambodia belonged to Pol Pot. The resulting state 
of Democratic Kampuchea, founded in the wake of the KCP 
victory, would shock the world with its extremism and start the 
Third Indochinese War. 
cGDK Strategy in Third Indochinese War 
On the surlace, the two main questions in the Third 
Indochinese War were 1) When would the Vietnamese army leave 
cambodia ; and 2) What will happen to the Cambodian regime 
that the Vietnamese plan to leave behind? The Vietnamese 
answered the first of these two questions when they announced 
in April 1989 that they would complete the pullout of their troops 
within siX months. The second question doesn't have so simple 
an answer , bu t the resolution of the first question set a clock to 
ticking toward an answer to the second. 
The end of 1978 came grimly to a belligerent Democratic 
Kampuchea . Afteryears of terror and mismanagement under the 
Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian people were in no mood to assist 
in the defense of the nation. Repeated rounds of concentric 
purges throughout all levels of the KCP for more than five years 
had left it in no condition to lead a defense of the homeland . When 
the Vietnamese finally responded to Pol Pot's border raids with 
a full scale invasion, they found a nation ready for collapse. 
During the week before Christmas, the Vietnamese used heavy 
armor and artillery with air support to attack and decimate the 
massed Democratic Kampuchean defenses in Svay Rieng and 
Kompong Thom provinces. Invading Vietnamese commanders 
then drove straight for Phnom Penh. skirting strong points of the 
Democratic Kampuchean army, and aiming for the heart of the 
nation . The invasion force took the capital on January 7, 1979, 
less than two weeks after the start of the campaign . The 
government of Democratic Kampuchea literally took to the hills, 
retreating with essential political and administrative personnel 
to mountain redouts in remote areas of the Thai -Kampuchean 
border . Pol Pot correctly calculated that his forces could hold out 
indefinitely in this traditional rebel region. 
The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). founded in 
the wake of the Vietnamese occupation in 1979, had its origins 
in an exile movement sponsored by Vietnam and largely made up 
of former officers, cadre and citizens of Democratic Kampuchea 
who fled to Vietnam to escape Pol Pot's purges during the late 
1970s. In the decade between the invasion of Cambodia and the 
decision to change the name of the People's Republic of Kampu-
chea to the State of Cambodia, the leaders of that hapless captive 
nation -state bravely toiled at such recovery as they could man-
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age in the killing fields left behind by Pol Pot's retreat ing 
revolution.• Considerable progress was made in improving the 
welfare and conditions of the Khmer people. Virtually all of the 
excesses of the Khmer Rouge era were eliminated, and a mar ket-
based economic recovery and a revival of religion and touris m 
has been brought underway. 10 
Nonetheless. the now-exiled government of Democra tic 
Kampuchea continued to exist and resist. During the summe r of 
1979 a tribunal in Phnom Penh convicted Pol Pot and his sec ond -
in-command, Ieng Sary. of genocide. Then. in the first of what h as 
became an almost ritualistic annual autumn challenge to the 
credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean representative s to 
the United Nations, the Chairman of the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea's Council of State. Heng Samrin. argued tha t the 
record of Khmer Rouge brutality disqualified them from govern -
ing. The United Nations credentials committee. however. deci ded 
to award the Cambodian seat to the representatives of Demo -
cratic Kampuchea, in respect of the principle that nation-s tates 
shall not be overthrown by neighboring force of arms. Thus did 
Pol Pot survive as the leader of the legal and wlegitimate" 
government of Cambodia. But not entirely without challe nge 
from the exile community. 
On October 9, 1979, Son Sann crossed over the Thai 
border a short distance into Cambodia, and declared the exis-
tence on Khmer soil of the Khmer People's National Liberati on 
Front (KPNLF). Son Sann had been a leader in Sihano uk's 
governments in the 1960s. at one point briefly rising to the post 
of Prime Minister. and returned to Cambodian politics during the 
period of the Khmer Republic in the early 1970s. Under the 
banner of the KPNLF, Sann proceeded to unify a number of rebel 
bands that had been operating along the Thai-Cambo dian 
frontier since the end of the Second Indochinese War. obtain ing 
1,1 the process a string of strategic bases ringing the Cambod ian 
·c,order. Sann hoped to offer himself as a "third force," an 
alternative between the Vietnamese supported government in 
Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge. Unfortunately, the very 
nature of his command - essentially a dispersed collectio n of 
armed bandits, mercenaries, ousted generals, the odd ideali st. 
and assorted rilT-rafI - invited chaos and insubordination . The 
resulting contention was so intense that by 1981 comma nd 
squabbles had robbed his organization of virtually all milita ry 
capability to operate in-country. 
Norodom Sihanouk had been held under house arre st 
throughout the reign of Democratic Kampuchea, but soon after 
. the rout of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 he managed to escape the ir 
108 
control. Operating independently once again, he tmmediately 
began to position himself as the compromise solution to the 
Vietnamese invasion and "puppet" regime. He reasoned that he 
had worked with the Vietnamese before and could do it again; 
likewiSe. he had lots of old friends among the Chinese. No other 
internationally acceptable party could claim such credentials. 
But he was mistaken. Sihanouk miscalculated the extent of 
support which would be offered by the People's Republic of China 
to their fraternal friends in the Kampuchean Communist Party. 
apparently forgetting that when Deng Xiaoping welcomed a 
trtumphant Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to Bejing in October 1977, the 
relationship between the communist parties of Cambodia and 
China was described as "Unbreakable." According to one ana-
lyst. this description had been used only once before, in the case 
of China's close alliance with Albania. 11 Sihanouk also miscalcu-
lated with respect to the Vietnamese. During the First and 
second Indochinese Wars. Sihanouk had closely cooperated 
with Vietnamese leaders like Pham Van Dong in repelling first the 
French and then the Americans. But at the outset of the Third 
Indochinese War. Pham Van Dong began publicly declaring that 
his old friend Sihanouk was "a finished man. "11 What must have 
shocked Sihanouk the most. however, was the fact that tmmedi-
ately after the Vietnamese invasion. the United States of America 
threw its support behind Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. President 
Carter's National Security Advisor Brzezinski recalled that in the 
spring of 1979, "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I 
encouraged the Thai to help the D.K. "1• The Reagan administra-
tion continued this covert policy. Soon Pol Pot's guerilla's were 
happily modeling US-issue combat gear for the international 
press. With the US. the PRC, the USSR and the Vietnamese all 
studiously attempting to ignore him, Sihanouk decided by the 
beginning of 1981 that he had better reconsider his "lone wolf" 
approach . Soon he was talking with Son Sann about forming a 
united front. 
Meanwhile. Pol Pot took a dim view of Sihanouk's and 
Sann's claims and armies. Moreover, the Democratic Kampuch-
ean resistance in the remote hills along the Thai-Kampuchean 
border continued to suffer attrition and lose territory to the 
Vietnamese invasion forces. The National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea was increasingly dispersed, diSorganized, and 
demoralized. By 1981 their strength was down to less than fifty 
thousand fighters, a fraction of their pre-invasion force, with no 
heavy weapons and irregular supplies. The continuing decline of 
the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) and their 
rather complete lack of success in defending the territorial 
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bservers to take the "Kampuchean Problem" seriously. Pol Pot's 
~ADK army spent much of it's time attacking Sihanouk's Army 
ofNat10nalist Sihanoukians (ANS) and Son Sann's Khmer People's 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF). who were busy unifying and 
then re-segregating their respective armies. Son Sann lost the 
leadership role of his faction several times in "camp coups" by his 
subordinates, only to invariably regain command at some later 
date due to continued disagreement in KPNLF ranks. Sihanouk 
has "quit" as head of the coalition government several times. and 
threatens to quit with a dizzying regularity. Pol Pot has repeat-
edly publicly "retired to academia" as part of the Democratic 
Ka111puchean negotiating strategy to de-emphasize their un-
popular leader. though it is unclear how much longer this tactic 
will remain effective. It is remarkable that despite this fractious 
and trregular behavior, the coalition seems to be progressing 
toward achievement of its goals. 
One of the key elements of Khmer Rouge strategy during 
the Second Indochinese War had been total secrecy and conceal-
ment of the revolutionary apparatus. This almost obsessive 
concern with secrecy was so religiously applied that it extended 
to years of denial that there was a communist party behind the 
peasant revolution. This avoided frightening simple peasants, or 
confusing international supporters who were committed to non-
communist members of FUNK and GRUNK. Known only as 
".Angkar" (The Organization). the communists went through the 
entire war without publicizing their program beyond the ranks of 
their own committed cadre. Not until September 1977, two and 
one half years after victory. did the Khmer Rouge officially reveal 
the existence of the Kampuchean Communist Party. 
This tactic has been adopted for the Third Indochinese 
War, as well. However, to conceal the existence of the heretofore 
ruling party apparatus, and convincingly deny the existence of 
the party. extreme measures were required. On December 7, 
1981, the Kampuchean Communist Party announced that it was 
officially dissolving itself. This had both tactical and strategic 
advantages. It's harder for enemies to destroy an organization 
that officially doesn't exist. and the potential to scare the 
Cambodian people with frightening memories of the prior regime 
was reduced with the covert approach. Moreover, this device 
allowed potential coalition partners to save face by arguing that 
they were not Joining up with communists. 
Throughout their years ofrevolution and power, roughly 
from 1968 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge showed no mercy on their 
opponents. real or suspected. The pattern has persisted since the 
formation of the CGDK in 1982. Population control is draconian 
111 
integrity of Democratic Kampchea against Vietnamese designs 
began to alarm their Chinese sponsors. Moreover. the apparent 
success of Vietnam in imposing suzerainty over the entire 
Indochinese Peninsula. and her representatives· frequent and 
loud assertions regarding the "irreversibility of the situation .. 
began to inspire alarm in some Association for Southeast Asia~ 
Nations (ASEAN) states. Thailand was especially alarmed, find-
ing it's armed forces in combat with Vietnamese forces in pursuit 
of retreating or retired resistance guerillas and base areas. The 
Thai's had already been considerably inconvenienced by the 
Khmer refugee problem along the border. With the arrival of the 
army of the traditional Vietnamese enemy at and crossing Thal-
Cambodian the border, the annoyance turned into an active 
search for ways to push the Cambodians back to Cambodia and 
the Vietnamese back to Vietnam. 
Largely at the urging of the Chinese and Siamese, then, 
inducements began to accumulate early in 1981 for formal 
cooperation among the various groups opposing the Vietnamese 
and their vassal in Kampuchea. The Chinese and Siamese 
orchestrated an international campaign that over the course of 
the year resulted in widespread pressures . The United States, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Australia. and the European Eco-
nomic Community all promised to provide aid to both Sihanouk's 
and Sann's groups if they would form a united front coalition of 
all the resistance groups. The Chinese agreed to increase funding 
to all three factions if they would unite against the "Vietnamese 
threat." After seemingly interminable diplomatic maneuvering, 
face-saving title changes and personnel shuffies, and the bogus 
dissolution of the Kampuchean Communist Party. the three 
resistance groups finally agreed in June 1982 to form the 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The 
agreement declaring the coalition was a carefully negotiated 
document designed to preserve the political identities and organ-
izational independence of the three resistance groups. Khieu 
Samphan, ably representing the interests of the Pol Pot group, 
insisted on a priority clause preserving the sovereignty of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea: " ... in the event that an impasse has developed 
which renders the coalition government of Democratic Kampu-
chea inoperative ... the current state of DK led by Mr. Khieu 
Samphan will have the right to resume its activities as the sole 
legal and legitimate state of Kampuchea ... ,. 
In a maze of diplomatic and military maneuvers over the 
course of the next seven years, the three partners of the coalition 
government of Democratic Kampuchea engaged in such bizarre 
and convoluted contortions that it became difficult for outside 
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in the refugee camps run by the National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea. 15 Treatment of those Cambodians not directly under 
NADK control ls reportedly harsher yet. As for the armies loyal to 
Sihanouk and Sann, the NADK's consistent goal has been to 
liquidate them before they have a chance to grow. The NADK has 
reveled in ambushing its allies, devising all manner of ruse to 
entrap and inflict casualties on Sihanouk's ANS and Sann's 
KPNLF. As if to make the NADK's mission simpler. internal 
dissension combined with Vietnamese militaxy assaults caused 
Son Sann's army to virtually disintegrate in 1986-1987. Unfor-
tunately for the Khmer Rouge, however, many of the stragglers 
rallied to Sihanouk's ANS. which is now stronger than ever. 
Nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge have several reasons to 
believe that their strategy for the Third Indochinese War is 
succeeding. First, they have survived. Second, they have coopled 
both socialist patrons (the PRC) and western patrons IASEAN 
and the United States) into facilitating their supply for a ten-year 
long militaxy confrontation with the Vietnamese. Third, they 
have created the general assumption that the current govern-
ment cannot survive the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, ensuring 
a role for the coalition government. Finally. a steady flow of arms 
and aid has enabled the Khmer Rouge to stockpile firepower for 
action once the hated hereditaxy enemy completes its military 
withdrawal. The Khmer Rouge are well-positioned to begin 
employment of violence in earnest against contenders to power 
within Cambodia. 
It is apparent then that as states go, the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea is indeed an unusual 
regime. Tom by combat among its factions and possessing little 
territory and few citizens, it is nonetheless positioned to return 
in whole or in part to the national capitol by virtue of its two 
principal resources: Sihanouk's heritage of legitimacy and the 
Khmer Rouge army. The Khmer Rouge political movement has 
shown both by its actions and by its declared doctrine for more 
than twenty years that it believes in force. They take literally 
Mao's saying that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. 
Thus, Sihanouk was the key to their survival during the decade 
of exile, when their options for coercion were limited. From Pol 
Pot's perspective. Sihanouk has already done his job, giving the 
Khmer Rouge enough international legitimacy to survive the 
decade-long Vietnamese interregnum. From Sihanouk's per-
spective, the Khmer Rouge have done their job, driving the 
Vietnamese army from Cambodia. Their struggle for domestic 
dominance will continue. But the history of the Indochinese 
Wars suggests that Sihanouk will not be able to defeat the Khmer 
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Rouge by himself. 
Historical and Theoretical Implications 
As we have seen. Cambodian leaders have used exile 
government organizations both as object and subject. During the 
Ftrst Indochinese War. Norodom Sihanouk's strategy reduced 
the exile organizations to the status of objects to be manipulated 
in his geopolitical contest with France. Pol Pot's strategy during 
the Second Indochinese War made the exile organization the 
subject, the nexus of the takeover, transmuting it into a regime. 
The Third Indochinese War has seen a combination of these 
approaches. with the outcome as yet uncertain. The outcome of 
the Third Indochinese War hinges. at least in part, on how the 
indices of legitimacy among the Khmer people have changed 
across fifty years of conflict. 
CQmpartson of Exile Tactics In Three Indochinese Wars 
The long decades of warfare in Indochina during the 
twentieth century created many crises for the leaders of Cambo-
dia, and on many occasions their response has been to form an 
exile government. Several points of comparison stand out from 
this rich history. In all three wars, geographical hosts and 
financial patrons were keys to success or failure in an exile 
organizations quest for power. In all three wars, control of the 
central symbols of nationhood was necessary to carry internal 
legitimacy and international recognition: successful exile insur-
gency required at least the sympathy. if not the active support of 
the King and the monks. Finally. across the three wars, the 
revolutionary potential of the Khmer people has varied, from 
moderate in the First Indochinese War, to intense in the Second, 
to totally absent in the Third. This last observation suggests that 
a transformation of the indices oflegitimacy is in progress among 
the Khmer body politic. 
In the Third Indochinese War, the various factions of the 
CGDK man.if est very different attitudes toward the people. As an 
organization the CGDK is distinguished by it's lack of a role inthe 
preservation of the diasportc Khmer nation and culture brought 
on by the last two Indochinese Wars. Democratic Kampuchea 
made it a special mission to exterminate most aspects of the 
Khmer nation and culture, so it is not surprising that the DK 
irredentists have played little role in preserving Khmer culture in 
the diaspora to which they belong. Sann and Sihanouk's organi-
zations, however. have done much in both the refugee camps and 
in resettled Khmer exile communities abroad to preserve tradi-
tional Khmer religious and social rituals. art, and customs. For 
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Sihanouk, thiS is necessary to remind people of his birthright. 
There is no way to know what in fact is the Will of the 
people of Cambodia . Certainly the CGDK as an entity cannot be 
said to speak for the Khmer people. Beyond the common desire 
for Vietnamese military Withdrawal, the CGDK has no coherent 
program. Son Sann and the factions gathered under his KPNLF 
umbrella represent some number of Cambodians. as by defini-
tion does Democratic Kampuchea. But these claims are negli-
gible. from a cultural or hiStorical perspection. to the symbolic 
value embodied in the person ofNorodom Sihanouk. The prince 
may still rule the hearts of the people, even though a very high 
percentage of them were not yet alive during Sihanouk's years in 
power. Many remember the relative stability of his years in power 
compared With the years since. It is probably remembered by 
some as the idyllic jungle paradise of ante bellum Cambodian 
mythology . The symbolic allure of the last. lost sovereign exerts 
a powerful influence that perhaps even the unprecedented 
brutality of the Khmer Rouge could not exterminate . 
Norodom Sihanouk has flirted with and/or participated 
in exile governments as a political technique for almost fifty 
years . It is not surprising, then. that he should once again be 
found at the center of exile political action in Cambodia . It would 
be surprising if he could ever trust the Khmer Rouge again, or 
even be expected to deal with them in good faith. He figures that 
five of his children and fourteen of his grandchildren were killed 
in various excesses of Democratic Kampuchea. Sihanouk has 
spent years under house arrest at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. 
and has seen them tear his "peaceful kingdom " assunder heaven 
and earth. He describes his coalition partners simply by saying, 
'They are not like us ."•• Once the Vietnamese have gone. it would 
not be at all surprising if he finds the State of Cambodia a better 
prospect for a coalition than his current partner , Democratic 
Kampuchea. 
International Dimension of Strate21c Choice 
Sihanouk is again positioned to off er himself as the one 
centrist and only legitimate solution to the decade-old "Kampu-
chea Problem ." But does he still embody the essence of the 
Khmer nation in his person as he did twenty years ago? On the 
one side, the domestically illegitimate but internationally recog-
nized Democratic Kampuchea quietly prepares to shoot Its way 
back into power. On the other side . the domestically legitimate 
but internationally rejected Phnom Penh regime desparately ne-
gotiates With anybody who will listen for protection from Pol Pot 
once the Vietnamese have gone . The Cambodians know what 
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they want. have known for many years. and are not likely to 
retreat from their various positions in the near future. Most of the 
remaining latitude for strategic choice in the Third Indochinese 
war belongs to outside powers. 
The Vietnamese made their choice. Under pressure from 
a retrenching Soviet Union the Vietnamese accelerated their 
planned withdrawal from Cambodia. It was a logical decision. 
and a win-win choice. Militarily, they had passed the point of 
dinlinishing returns when the resistance gave up trying to def end 
fixed installations inside People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
territory. The withdrawal will be popular not only with the 
Cambodian public and the international community. but also 
among the Vietnamese army, party and people. If need be, they 
can always return. But the withdrawal constrains their latitude 
for future decisions in important ways. reducing the Vietnamese 
capacity to influence the shape of the next Cambodian govern-
ment. 
The choices available to the United States are also limited 
by its past actions . It seems unlikely that the United States will 
sustain its cynical policy of public condemnation and covert 
support of Democratic Kampuchea through the conclusion of the 
Third Indochinese War; the Bush administration has shown 
some signs that a change may already be taking place. However. 
the lengths to which the US might be willing to go in support of 
a solution to the Kampuchea Problem again are limited by past 
actions. and the resulting domestic political realities. US room 
for maneuver has also been limited by a tendency to defer to the 
presumably superior regional interests of an important strategic 
ally, the People's Republic of China. 
Thailand has played a crucial role in the survival of the 
Khmer resistance factions through the Third Indochinese War. 
The Thais have provided sanctuary to resistance fighters and 
refugees , acted as host state to their political and military 
organizations, supplied political and military intelligence. facili-
tated logistics for foreign military assistance, and exerted limited 
combat support for border area operations. However, some 
reports indicate that this type of Thai assistance to the CGDK 
started to dwindle early in 1989. as Thai generals and politicians 
began to reassess their interests." The Vietnamese military 
withdrawal has calmed Thai security concerns. which are begin-
ning to give way to the economic interests flowing from tradi-
tional cross-border trade patterns. This shift adds pressure on 
the CGDK to achieve a settlement before Thai hospitality erodes 
completely . 
The only cards that really matter at the end of the Third 
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Indochinese War are held by the Chinese Communist Party. The 
Chinese relationship with the Soviet Union may dictate a reduc-
tion in tensions that could rebound to the benefit Sihanouk's 
efforts to build a new coalition. The experience of the First and 
Second Indochinese Wars, however, is that the Chinese prefer a 
government in Cambodia that is not just independent of but 
actually hostile to Vietnam. If the Chinese are consistent in the 
Third Indochinese War, this will mean continued strong support 
for an eventual return of the Democratic Kampuchean faction of 
the resistance to national power in Cambodia. 
The limitations on the national sovereignty of People's 
Republic of Kampuchea - since April 1989 known as the State 
of Cambodia - are substantial. This is why Prime Minister Hun 
Sen has been desperately bargaining for Sihanouk's imprimatur. 
Although the Cambodian leader is the youngest politician in the 
entire drama, he appears to understand the fundamental fact 
that domestic legitimation and international recognition are 
historically conditioned. The People's Republic of Kampuchea 
was judged guilty by association with Vietnam. The regime could 
not achieve international recognition, despite a very substantial 
improvement of the general welfare of the Khmer people. This 
was the judgment of the international community, apparenlly in 
support of the principle that states shall not be overthrown by 
neighboring force of arms, no matter how unsavory the regime in 
question. The new "State of Cambodia" has permitted participa-
tion by non-communist Khmer leaders such as In Tam, has 
enshrined in its basic law free market and human rights prin-
ciples, and has declared anew that Buddhism is the official 
national religion. To the extent that this "glasnostic" behavior 
continues, the State of Cambodia may be seen as a transitional 
regime between the PRK and whatever post-occupation regime 
emerges. 18 
Is the legal Cambodian (exile) regime - Democratic 
Kampuchea - really a state? Although it lacks control of the 
national seat of government, Democratic Kampuchea seems to 
have most of the other traditional attributes of a modem state. 
DK citizens (refugees and soldiers). international recognition (the 
UN, etc.). received embassies (ASEAN states, etc.), executive 
organs (e.g., the Supreme Military Commission). and active 
governance (again of the camps). Thus, it would seem that 
Democratic Kampuchea is indeed a state according to traditional 
definitions. Yet Democratic Kampuchea is not a nation-state. As 
Aristotle recommended, the nature of a state can be inf erred from 
the nature of its citizens. In this case, the citizens are the literally 
imprisoned residents of DK controlled camps, and the soldiers of 
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the NADK. There is no persuasive evidence whatsoever to suggest 
that the people of Kampuchea at large claim DK as their own, and 
much evidence to support precisely the contrary proposition. 
consistent reports of summary execution are continuing to come 
from the border areas. 1• This is the same state whose national 
anthem runs: 
Bright red blood that covers the towns and plains 
of Kampuchea, Our Motherland, 
Sublime blood of workers and peasants, 
Sublime blood of revolutionary men and women 
.fighters, 
The blood changing into unre enting hatred. 20 
Whereas many exile organizations are thought of as stateless 
nations (e.g., the Palestinians}, DK is the case of a nationless 
state . Representing no more than the will of an elite cadre, a 
nationless state makes for an excellent pawn in big power geo-
politics. If a group as universally notorious as the Khmer Rouge 
can successfully employ the government-in-exile technique not 
once, but twice, then the technique may well be an extremely 
effective form of political action in and of itself. 
The organic sources of exile governments seem to lie in 
the dynamics of international politics. As a mechanism for 
practitioners of weak power politics to battle the intervention of 
strong powers, exile government has repeatedly shown itself to 
be a potent strategy in Indochina. As a mechanism to achieve 
a voice in national debate for disenfranchised constituencies, 
however, exile governments in Cambodia have been less effec-
tive. On balance, given the environments faced by and the goals 
of Khmer politicians during all three Indochinese wars, the 
strategy of exile government has been astonishingly effective. 
However. as long as stronger neighbors view it as in their 
interests to manipulate Cambodian politics by funding and 
supporting insurgent movements, invading Cambodian terri-
tory, or otherwise working their will on this weak country, 
Cambodians can know little peace. 
Among Cambodians, Khmer myths are evolving in a way 
that may be unprecedented in thousands of years of history. 
Buddhism will never be the same as it always has been in 
Cambodia; too much of the tradition was lost during the rule of 
Pol Pot. Neither will the king, his court, and the associated 
politics ever play the roles they always did in Cambodian affairs; 
though Sihanouk has a credible heir in Prince Ranaridh, the 
Khmer Rouge were able to destroy most of the people and 
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artifacts giving life to the royal tradition. The symbolic extinction 
of monarchy and monachy will have a profound effect on the 
future political, social, and psychological topography of Cambo-
dia. What effect this will have on the current struggle Will soon 
become clear. 
Conclusion: Exile Government as a Form of Political Strugg le 
In all three of the major Indochinese conflicts since 1940, 
Khmer leaders declared formal exile governments. In the First 
Indochinese War, Norodom Sihanouk used exile groups to 
achieve independence from France and as a tool for the King to 
practice his successful authoritarian politics of the center. In 
the Second Indochinese War, an exile group used Sihanouk to 
defeat the client regime of the United States, only to lose the 
hard-won independence to Vietnam in the Third Indochinese 
War. In that second war, the Khmer Rouge instituted a highly 
sophisticated strategy, using Sihanouk's prestige to attract 
peasants to their FUNK organization and international support 
to their CRUNK exile government, while maintaining control of 
events with their peasant army. The Khmer Rouge view their 
exile government in the Third Indochinese War as manifestly 
tactical. while Sihanouk plays it as a strategic game . The exile 
organizations arising out of Third Indochinese War may yet 
make a positive contribution to solution of the tortured "Kam-
puchean Problem." This constitutes a remarkable record of 
accomplishment for weak state actors in big power politics. 
Several factors stand out as significant from a comparison 
across these experiences: host and patron states, control of the 
symbols of nationalism, and domestic versus international 
legitimation. 
Consistent geographical hosts and financial and diplo-
matic patrons are a prerequisite for a successful Khmer exile 
movement. The lack of steadfast patrons. in and of itself, was 
sufficient to account for the failures of the exile movements of 
the First Indochinese War. The Vietnamese in the case of the 
Khmer Viet Minh, and the Thai's in the case of the Khmer 
Issarak, both found it in their national interest to abandon 
support for the exiles· aspiriations before the conclusion of the 
peace. Similarly. analysts credit the considerable assistance of 
hosts and patrons of Khmer exile movements- the Vietnamese 
and Chinese in the Second Indochinese War, and the Vietnam-
ese. Thais and the Chinese in the Third - with key roles in the 
progress of the movements. Vietnamese and Chinese support 
for CRUNK was essential to success: Vietnamese military 
support and Chinese diplomatic and financial support made the 
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difference in the Second Indochinese War. Again, early in the 
Third Indochinese War, Vietnamese arms brought exiles to 
power in Cambodia as the People's Republic of Kampuchea. If 
the CGDK succeeds in becoming a successor government to the 
pRK. it will be due to the steadfast assistance the coalition has 
received from Thai hosts and Chinese patrons. Alternatively, 
shifting Thal perceptions of their interests may force the Khmer 
exiles of the Third Indochinese War to be repatriated before a 
solution emerges. 
Control of the symbols of nationalism in Cambodia is also 
crucial to the success of exile movements. For a hundred 
generations or more. the King of Cambodia has represented to 
the Khmer people something more than a sovereign. The God-
King wields supreme spiritual power as well. and as such. the 
monarch is the symbolic center of Khmer society. Norodom 
Sihanouk has played this role during all three major Indochi-
nese conflicts of this century. In the First and Second Indochi-
nese Wars, Sihanouk manipulated these symbols with skill, 
brtnging himself to power in the first war and his coalition 
partners to power in the second. In the Third Indochinese War, 
it seems reasonable to expect that the outcome will be consis-
tent with that of the previous two wars, at least in respect to the 
symbolic potency of the former King. 
To make an anology with mathematics. it seems that in 
the Khmer case the degree of international legitimation attach-
ing to an exile regime determines the domain or the structure of 
Cambodian politics, while the degree of domestic legitimacy the 
exile regime generates determines the range or the process of the 
politics. In the First Indochinese War, great powers refused to 
recognize the Khmer exile groups, allowing Sihanouk to domi-
nate the exiles in international negotiations: his claim to 
domestic legitimacy was strong enough to support his rule for 
fifteen years. Similarly. in the Second Indochinese War, 
Sihanouk's participation in the exile coalition lent enough 
credibility to the exile government for it to win initial interna-
tional acceptance upon victory in spite of the strong opposition 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union: on the domestic 
front. however. the extreme radicalism of the resulting state of 
Democratic Kampuchea - including an uncompromising pro-
gram to eradicate all vestiges of the monarchy and Buddhism-
soon robbed DK of the Mandate of Heaven. In the Third 
Indochinese War, the PRK's lack of international recognition 
assured its eventual failure by creating the conditions neces-
sary to sustain multiple armed challenges lo its rule: domesti-
cally, after the daily terror in Democratic Kampuchea. the PRK's 
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moderate policies seemed to be enough to ensure a relative 
degree of internal stability. even though the PRK was clearly 
sponsored by Vietnam. Continued foreign sponsorship of mul-
tiple armed exile organizations, however. has defined the con-
flict structure imposed upon Cambodian politics through the 
1980s. and beyond. 
The key to the success of the Khmer Rouge during their 
decade in exile has been their very survival. This they owe to 
their Thai hosts and their Chinese patrons. Although they are 
able to stroll the halls of the United Nations in New York draped 
in the flag of their state, at home they are naked emperors. They 
can claim international recognition. but domestic legitimacy 
eludes them. The Khmer Rouge record on use-of-force assures 
that domestic legitimacy will continue to elude them. The 
Chinese have been careful to ensure that the Khmer Rouge 
maintain the strongest army of all the Khmer factions, and the 
Khmer Rouge know what to do with a good coercive apparatus. 
The successful communist strategy of the Second Indochinese 
War- control of the coercive apparatus, a broad based united 
front organization including the symbolic sovereign. and denial 
of the existence of the party-was redeployed again in the Third 
Indochinese War. 
CGDK strategy for the Third Indochinese War founders 
on the questions of sustaining internal conflict in Cambodia. 
When one cuts through all of the diplomatic niceties, the Khmer 
Rouge remain the legal rulers of Cambodia. According to the 
over-whelming majority of the members of the United Nations, 
Democratic Kampuchea is the sovereign state of Cambodia. It 
seems unlikely that the Khmer Rouge will voluntarily relinquish 
this claim to legitimacy and sovereignty. The only way for them 
to move from dejure sovereignty to de facto sovereignty. how-
ever. is to resume and sustain violence within Cambodia in the 
wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal. physically removing com-
peting aspirants to power. This is where the coalition 
government's strategy loses coherence. With the Vietnamese 
out, Sihanouk seeks reconciliation among all Khmer while the 
Khmer Rouge seek to def end the sovereignty of their Democratic 
Kampuchean state. As the goals of Sihanouk and the Khmer 
Rouge diverge, the coalition government of Democratic Kampu-
chea loses it's source of moral - but not legal - legitimacy. 
For many years various observers inside Kampuchea and 
out have urged the People's Republic of China and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics to resolve their differences in such a 
fashion as to allow a settlement of the "Kampuchea Problem." 
For seasoned observers of superpower politics. it should come 
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as no surprise that when these powers finally find it in their 
interest to begin to move toward a solution. the result would 
appear to be heading for one of the most cynical and harmful 
possible outcomes. The Vietnamese decision to pull out before 
a political settlement has been completed leaves the door open 
for a return of the Khmer Rouge. The Sino-Soviet Summit of May 
l 989 left no reason for undue optimism on this score; the final 
communique of the summit blandly intoned. "Tile Soviet Union 
and China affirmed that they will make every effort for an early. 
fair. and suitable resolution to the Cambodian issue by political 
moves."" Subsequent efforts by Deng Xiaoping to purge moder-
ates in the Chinese Communist Party positively suggest pessi-
mism; Deng has long been a Pol Pot supporter. Strength on the 
ground is often decisive and this factor weighs in favor of the 
Democratic Kampuchean irredentists. Still. Sihanouk's sym-
bolic power is the trump card in Cambodian politics. The 
stability of any mediated solution to the problem would depend 
heavily on international guarantees. backed up with force. to 
alleviate mischief by a revanchist Khmer Rouge. However. 
experience in other conflicts suggests that peace-keeping troops 
can only keep a peace that has already been established. The 
Namibia-style solution proposed by the U .N. Security Council in 
January 1990 will be severely tested by the Cambodian legacy 
of political violence. Though the Third Indochinese Warmaywell 
be drawing to an end. this does not necessarily imply the estab-
lishment of peace in Cambodia. 
At the present Juncture the fate of the people of Kampu-
chea seems to depend to a large extent on Chinese policy. It is 
mainly Chinese support that has allowed the Khmer Rouge to 
endure their defeat and decade of exile. and the Chinese more 
than anyone else are favorably positioned to effect some control 
of the Khmer Rouge. Continued Chinese military aid may enable 
the Khmer Rouge to regenerate their totalitarian control of 
Cambodia. If the Chinese were to resist the temptation to 
continue this support. and if a face-saving formula could be 
found to permit the Phnom Penh factions and the non-commu-
nist resistance factions to rally to Sihanouk as a symbol of the 
center. and if international aid to the new regime was forthcom-
ing to resist Khmer Rouge military encroachments, the Khmer 
people might yet know peace in this century. But that is a lot of 
ifs. 
The more likely outcome of the Third Indochinese War, 
consistent with that of the First and Second Wars. is the exile 
organizations will again succeed in transforming the conditions 
of Cambodian conflict from external threat to civil war. The 
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conference convened in Palis in August 1989 - ostensibly 
called to settle the Third Indochinese War - ended with 
characteristic ambiguity. Sihanouk resigned as head of the 
coalition: the Khmer Rouge demonstrated unexpectedly heavy 
firepower in early dry -season border battles; the Chinese threat-
ened trouble if the Khmer Rouge were excluded from any 
settlement: and the foreign secretaries of the U.S .. U.S.S.R., 
China and Britain boycotted the final sessions. Summing up the 
lack of substantive progress at the Palis talks. Sihanouk at one 
point quipped. "We Khmer love to fight. We'll cooperate later. M22 
The history of Khmer exile behavior over the course of three 
Indochinese wars in the last fifty years gives one pause to 
wonder how much longer the Khmer people will have to wait for 
cooperation among Khmer leaders. and how much more war lies 
between now and then. 
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